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Every psycho-analyst knows from experience with what certainty this explanation of solicitous over- affection is found to erectile dysfunction medication samples cheap silvitra 120mg with amex apply even in the most unlikely circumstances in cases impotence forums proven 120mg silvitra, for instance erectile dysfunction pump demonstration silvitra 120mg, of attachments between a mother and child or between a devoted married couple erectile dysfunction doctor in bangalore cheap 120mg silvitra. If we now apply this to the case of privileged persons, we shall realize that alongside the veneration, and indeed idolization, felt towards them, there is in the unconscious an opposing current of intense hostility; that, in fact, as we expected, we are faced by a situation of emotional ambivalence. The distrust which provides one of the unmistakable elements in kingly taboos would thus be another, more direct, expression of the same unconscious hostility. Indeed, owing to the variety of outcomes of a conflict of this kind which are reached among different peoples, we are not at a loss for examples in which the existence of this hostility is still more obviously shown. Hence when the leading chiefs have a spite at a man and wish to rid themselves of him, they elect him king. Totem And Taboo 2696 Another side of the attitude of primitive peoples towards their rulers recalls a procedure which is common in neuroses generally but comes into the open in what are known as delusions of persecution. The importance of one particular person is immensely exaggerated and his absolute power is magnified to the most improbable degree, in order that it may be easier to make him responsible for everything disagreeable that the patient may experience. Savages are really behaving in just the same way with their kings when they ascribe to them power over rain and sunshine, wind and weather, and then depose them or kill them because Nature disappoints their hopes of a successful hunt or a rich harvest. The model upon which paranoics base their delusions of persecution is the relation of a child to his father. A son’s picture of his father is habitually clothed with excessive powers of this kind, and it is found that distrust of the father is intimately linked with admiration for him. When a paranoic turns the figure of one of his associates into a ‘persecutor’, he is raising him to the rank of a father: he is putting him into a position in which he can blame him for all his misfortunes. Thus this second analogy between savages and neurotics gives us a glimpse of the truth that much of a savage’s attitude to his ruler is derived from a child’s infantile attitude to his father. But the strongest support for our effort to equate taboo prohibitions with neurotic symptoms is to be found in the taboo ceremonials themselves, the effect of which upon the position of royalty has already been discussed. These ceremonials unmistakably reveal their double meaning and their derivation from ambivalent impulses, as soon as we are ready to allow that the results which they bring about were intended from the first. The taboo does not only pick out the king and exalt him above all common mortals, it also makes his existence a torment and an intolerable burden and reduces him to a bondage far worse than that of his subjects. Here, then, we have an exact counterpart of the obsessional act in the neurosis, in which the suppressed impulse and the impulse that suppresses it find simultaneous and common satisfaction. The obsessional act is ostensibly a protection against the prohibited act; but actually, in our view, it is a repetition of it. The ‘ostensibly’ applies to the conscious part of the mind, and the ‘actually’ to the unconscious part. In exactly the same way, the ceremonial taboo of kings is ostensibly the highest honour and protection for them, while actually it is a punishment for their exaltation, a revenge taken on them by their subjects. The experiences of Sancho Panza (as described by Cervantes) when he was Governor of his island convinced him that this view of court ceremonial was the only one that met the case. If we could hear the views of modern kings and rulers on the subject, we might find that there were many others who agreed with him. Totem And Taboo 2697 the question of why the emotional attitude towards rulers includes such a powerful unconscious element of hostility raises a very interesting problem, but one that lies outside the limits of the present study. I have already hinted at the fact that the child’s complex of emotions towards his father the father-complex has a bearing on the subject, and I may add that more information on the early history of the kingship would throw a decisive light on it. Frazer (1911a) has put forward impressive reasons, though, as he himself admits, not wholly conclusive ones, for supposing that the earliest kings were foreigners who, after a brief reign, were sacrificed with solemn festivities as representatives of the deity. It is possible that the course taken by the evolution of kings may also have had an influence upon the myths of Christendom. The taboo upon the dead is if I may revert to the simile of infection especially virulent among most primitive peoples. It is manifested, in the first instance, in the consequences that follow contact with the dead and in the treatment of mourners. Among the Maoris anyone who had handled a corpse or taken any part in its burial was in the highest degree unclean and was almost cut off from intercourse with his fellow-men, or, as we might put it, was boycotted. He could not enter any house, or come into contact with any person or thing without infecting them. He might not even touch food with his hands, which, owing to their uncleanness, had become quite useless. In some cases he would be fed by another person, who with outstretched arm contrived to do it without touching the tabooed man; but the feeder was himself subjected to many severe restrictions, little less onerous than those which were imposed upon the other. In almost every populous village there lived a degraded wretch, the lowest of the low, who earned a sorry pittance by thus waiting upon the defiled. And when, the dismal term of his seclusion being over, the mourner was about to mix with his fellows once more, all the dishes he had used in his seclusion were diligently smashed, and all the garments he had worn were carefully thrown away. Their most regular feature is the prohibition against those who have had such contact touching food themselves, and the consequent necessity for their being fed by other people. It is a remarkable fact that in Polynesia (though the report may perhaps refer only to Hawaii) priestly kings were subject to the same restriction while performing their sacred functions. Thus anyone who touches a dead chief is unclean for ten months; but if he himself is a chief he is only tabooed for three, four, or five months according to the rank of the dead man; but if the dead man were the ‘great divine chief’, even the greatest chief would be tabooed for ten months. These savages believe firmly that anyone who violates the taboo ordinances is bound to fall ill and die; indeed they believe it so firmly that, in the opinion of an observer, ‘no native ever made an experiment to prove the contrary’. The observances that we have so far mentioned may seem merely to give characteristic expression to the virulence of the taboo and its contagious power. But those which now follow give us a hint at the reasons for the taboo both the ostensible ones and what we must regard as the deep- lying real ones. The same purpose is shown still more clearly in the usage reported from another North American tribe which provides that, after her husband’s death, ‘a widow would wear a breech-cloth made of dry bunch-grass for several days to prevent her husband’s ghost having intercourse with her. To prevent this fatal catastrophe, the widow knocks with a wooden peg on the trees as she goes along, thus warning people of her dangerous proximity; and the very trees on which she knocks soon die. He may not cultivate a garden, nor show himself in public, nor walk on the roads and paths. Like a wild beast he must skulk in the long grass and the bushes; and if he sees or hears anyone coming, especially a woman, he must hide behind a tree or a thicket. A man who has lost his wife must resist a desire to find a substitute for her; a widow must fight against the same wish and is moreover liable, being without a lord and master, to arouse the desires of other men. Substitutive satisfactions of such a kind run counter to the sense of mourning and they would inevitably kindle the ghost’s wrath. Totem And Taboo 2699 One of the most puzzling, but at the same time instructive usages in connection with mourning is the prohibition against uttering the name of the dead person. This custom is extremely widespread, it is expressed in a variety of ways and has had important consequences. It is found not only among the Australians and Polynesians (who usually show us taboo observances in the best state of preservation), but also among ‘peoples so widely separated from each other as the Samoyeds of Siberia and the Todas of southern India; the Mongols of Tartary and the Tuaregs of the Sahara; the Ainos of Japan and the Akamba and Nandi of central Africa; the Tinguianes of the Philippines and the inhabitants of the Nicobar Islands, of Borneo, of Madagascar, and of Tasmania. The avoidance of the name of a dead person is as a rule enforced with extreme severity. Thus in some South American tribes it is regarded as a deadly insult to the survivors to mention the name of a dead relative in their presence, and the punishment for it is not less than that laid down for murder. Thus the Masai in East Africa resort to the device of changing the dead man’s name immediately after his death; he may then be mentioned freely under his new name while all the restrictions remain attached to the old one. This seems to presuppose that the dead man’s ghost does not know and will not get to know his new name. The Adelaide and Encounter Bay tribes of South Australia are so consistently careful that after a death everyone bearing the same name as the dead man’s, or a very similar one, changes it for another. In some instances, as for instance among certain tribes in Victoria and in North-West America, this is carried a step further, and after a death all the dead person’s relations change their names, irrespective of any similarity in their sound. Indeed, among the Guaycurus in Paraguay, when a death had taken place, the chief used to change the name of every member of the tribe; and ‘from that moment everybody remembered his new name just as if he had borne it all his life’. This usage leads to a perpetual change of vocabulary, which causes much difficulty to the missionaries, especially when such changes are permanent. In the seven years which the missionary Dobrizhoffer spent among the Abipones of Paraguay, ‘the native word for jaguar was changed thrice, and the words for crocodile, thorn, and the slaughter of cattle underwent similar though less varied vicissitudes’. A number of these primitive races have, however, adopted compensatory usages which revive the names of dead persons after a long period of mourning by giving them to children, who are thus regarded as reincarnations of the dead.

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Even in the unconscious impotence at 60 order silvitra 120mg with amex, moreover erectile dysfunction pills dischem order silvitra 120 mg free shipping, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea best erectile dysfunction pills 2012 silvitra 120 mg low price. If the instinct did not attach itself to impotence 10 purchase discount silvitra online an idea or manifest itself as an affective state, we could know nothing about it. When we nevertheless speak of an unconscious instinctual impulse or of a repressed instinctual impulse, the looseness of phraseology is a harmless one. We can only mean an instinctual impulse the ideational representative of which is unconscious, for nothing else comes into consideration. We should expect the answer to the question about unconscious feelings, emotions and affects to be just as easily given. Thus the possibility of the attribute of unconsciousness would be completely excluded as far as emotions, feelings and affects are concerned. But in psycho-analytic practice we are accustomed to speak of unconscious love, hate, anger, etc. Is there more meaning in the use of these terms than there is in speaking of ‘unconscious instincts’fi In the first place, it may happen that an affective or emotional impulse is perceived but misconstrued. Owing to the repression of its proper representative it has been forced to become connected with another idea, and is now regarded by consciousness as the manifestation of that idea. If we restore the true connection, we call the original affective impulse an ‘unconscious’ one. Yet its affect was never unconscious; all that had happened was that its idea had undergone repression. In general, the use of the terms ‘unconscious affect’ and ‘unconscious emotion’ has reference to the vicissitudes undergone, in consequence of repression, by the quantitative factor in the instinctual impulse. We know that three such vicissitudes are possible:fi either the affect remains, wholly or in part, as it is; or it is transformed into a qualitatively different quota of affect, above all into anxiety; or it is suppressed, i. In every instance where repression has succeeded in inhibiting the development of affects, we term those affects (which we restore when we undo the work of repression) ‘unconscious’. Thus it cannot be denied that the use of the terms in question is consistent; but in comparison with unconscious ideas there is the important difference that unconscious ideas continue to exist after repression as actual structures in the system Ucs. Strictly speaking, then, and although no fault can be found with the linguistic usage, there are no unconscious affects as there are unconscious ideas. The whole difference arises from the fact that ideas are cathexes basically of memory-traces whilst affects and feelings correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which are perceived as feelings. In the present state of our knowledge of affects and feelings we cannot express this difference more clearly. The Unconscious 3002 It is of especial interest to us to have established the fact that repression can succeed in inhibiting an instinctual impulse from being turned into a manifestation of affect. Nevertheless, there is an unmistakable difference in the relation of the controlling system to the two contiguous processes of discharge. Even within the limits of normal life we can recognize that a constant struggle for primacy over affectivity goes on between the two systems Cs. It is possible for the development of affect to proceed directly from the system Ucs. Often, however, the instinctual impulse has to wait until it has found a substitutive idea in the system Cs. The development of affect can then proceed from this conscious substitute, and the nature of that substitute determines the qualitative character of the affect. We have asserted that in repression a severance takes place between the affect and the idea to which it belongs, and that each then undergoes its separate vicissitudes. Descriptively, this is incontrovertible; in actuality, however, the affect does not as a rule arise till the break- through to a new representation in the system Cs. It must be a matter of a withdrawal of cathexis; but the question is, in which system does the withdrawal take place and to which system does the cathexis that is withdrawn belongfi Let us take the case of repression proper (‘after-pressure’), as it affects an idea which is preconscious or even actually conscious. Here repression can only consist in withdrawing from the idea the (preconscious cathexis which belongs to the system Pcs. Thus there is a withdrawal of the preconscious cathexis, retention of the unconscious cathexis, or replacement of the preconscious cathexis by an unconscious one. We notice, moreover, that we have based these reflections (as it were, without meaning to) on the assumption that the transition from the system Ucs. But this process of withdrawal of libido is not adequate to make another characteristic of repression comprehensible to us. It is not clear why the idea which has remained cathected or has received cathexis from the Ucs. If it could do so, the withdrawal of libido from it would have to be repeated, and the same performance would go on endlessly; but the outcome would not be repression. So, too, when it comes to describing primal repression, the mechanism just discussed of withdrawal of preconscious cathexis would fail to meet the case; for here we are dealing with an unconscious idea which has as yet received no cathexis from the Pcs. The Unconscious 3004 What we require, therefore, is another process which maintains the repression in the first case and, in the second, ensures its being established as well as continued. This other process can only be found in the assumption of an anticathexis, by means of which the system Pcs. We shall see from clinical examples how such an anticathexis, operating in the system Pcs. It is this which represents the permanent expenditure of a primal repression, and which also guarantees the permanence of that repression. Anticathexis is the sole mechanism of primal repression; in the case of repression proper (‘after-pressure’) there is in addition withdrawal of the Pcs. It is very possible that it is precisely the cathexis which is withdrawn from the idea that is used for anticathexis. We see how we have gradually been led into adopting a third point of view in our account of psychical phenomena. Besides the dynamic and the topographical points of view, we have adopted the economic one. This endeavours to follow out the vicissitudes of amounts of excitation and to arrive at least at some relative estimate of their magnitude. It will not be unreasonable to give a special name to this whole way of regarding our subject-matter, for it is the consummation of psycho-analytic research. I propose that when we have succeeded in describing a psychical process in its dynamic, topographical and economic aspects, we should speak of it as a metapsychological presentation. We must say at once that in the present state of our knowledge there are only a few points at which we shall succeed in this. The Unconscious 3005 Let us make a tentative effort to give a metapsychological description of the process of repression in the three transference neuroses which are familiar to us. Here we may replace ‘cathexis’ by ‘libido’, because, as we know, it is the vicissitudes of sexual impulses with which we shall be dealing. In anxiety hysteria a first phase of the process is frequently overlooked, and may perhaps be in fact missed out; on careful observation, however, it can be clearly discerned. It consists in anxiety appearing without the subject knowing what he is afraid of. On the occasion of a repetition (if there should be one) of this process, a first step is taken in the direction of mastering the unwelcome development of anxiety. The cathexis that has taken flight attaches itself to a substitutive idea which, on the one hand, is connected by association with the rejected idea, and, on the other, has escaped repression by reason of its remoteness from that idea. This substitutive idea a ‘substitute by displacement’ permits the still uninhibitable development of anxiety to be rationalized. On the other hand it is, or acts as if it were, the point of departure for the release of the anxiety-affect, which has now really become quite uninhibitable. Clinical observation shows, for instance, that a child suffering from an animal phobia experiences anxiety under two kinds of conditions: in the first place, when his repressed love-impulse becomes intensified, and, in the second, when he perceives the animal he is afraid of. The substitutive idea acts in the one instance as a point at which there is a passage across from the system Ucs. The child may perhaps end by behaving as though he had no predilection whatever towards his father but had become quite free from him, and as though his fear of the animal was a real fear except that this fear of the animal, fed as such a fear is from an unconscious instinctual source, proves obdurate and exaggerated in the face of all influences brought to bear from the system Cs. The process of repression, as we know, is not yet completed, and it finds a further aim in the task of inhibiting the development of the anxiety which arises from the substitute. This is achieved by the whole of the associated environment of the substitutive idea being cathected with special intensity, so that it can display a high degree of sensibility to excitation.

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Not to what std causes erectile dysfunction discount silvitra 120 mg mastercard ‘touch’ one’s genitals is the phrase employed for forbidding auto-erotic satisfaction erectile dysfunction treatment options generic silvitra 120mg on-line. Since obsessional neurosis begins by persecuting erotic touching and then erectile dysfunction best medication order silvitra 120 mg with amex, after regression has taken place erectile dysfunction treatment perth 120 mg silvitra visa, goes on to persecute touching in the guise of aggressiveness, it follows that nothing is so strongly proscribed in that illness as touching nor so well suited to become the central point of a system of prohibitions. But isolating is removing the possibility of contact; it is a method of withdrawing a thing from being touched in any way. And when a neurotic isolates an impression or an activity by interpolating an interval, he is letting it be understood symbolically that he will not allow his thoughts about that impression or activity to come into associative contact with other thoughts. Inhibitions, Symptoms And Anxiety 4281 this is as far as our investigations into the formation of symptoms take us. It is hardly worth while summing them up, for the results they have yielded are scanty and incomplete and tell us scarcely anything that we do not already know. It would be fruitless to turn our attention to symptom-formation in other disorders besides phobias, conversion hysteria and obsessional neurosis, for too little is known about them. But in reviewing those three neuroses together we are brought up against a very serious problem the consideration of which can no longer be put off. All three have as their outcome the destruction of the Oedipus complex; and in all three the motive force of the ego’s opposition is, we believe, the fear of castration. Yet it is only in the phobias that this fear comes to the surface and is acknowledged. The problem becomes accentuated when we recall the possibility, already referred to, that anxiety arises directly, by a kind of fermentation, from a libidinal cathexis whose processes have been disturbed. Furthermore, is it absolutely certain that fear of castration is the only motive force of repression (or defence)fi For though we can with certainty establish in them the presence of a castration complex, we can hardly speak with propriety of castration anxiety where castration has already taken place. In animal phobias, then, the ego has to oppose a libidinal object-cathexis coming from the id a cathexis that belongs either to the positive or the negative Oedipus complex because it believes that to give way to it would entail the danger of castration. This question has already been discussed, but there still remains a doubtful point to clear up. In ‘Little Hans’s’ case that is, in the case of a positive Oedipus complex was it his fondness for his mother or was it his aggressiveness towards his father which called out the defence by the egofi In practice it seems to make no difference, especially as each set of feelings implies the other; but the question has a theoretical interest, since it is only the feeling of affection for the mother which can count as a purely erotic one. The aggressive impulse flows mainly from the destructive instinct; and we have always believed that in a neurosis it is against the demands of the libido and not against those of any other instinct that the ego is defending itself. In point of fact we know that after ‘Hans’s’ phobia had been formed, his tender attachment to his mother seemed to disappear, having been completely disposed of by repression, while the formation of the symptom (the substitutive formation) took place in relation to his aggressive impulses. The impulse that was repressed his feminine attitude towards his father was a genuinely erotic one; and it was in relation to that impulse that the formation of his symptoms took place. It is almost humiliating that, after working so long, we should still be having difficulty in understanding the most fundamental facts. If we cannot see things clearly we will at least see clearly what the obscurities are. What is hampering us here is evidently some hitch in the development of our theory of the instincts. We began by tracing the organization of the libido through its successive stages from the oral through the sadistic-anal to the genital and in doing so placed all the components of the sexual instinct on the same footing. Later it appeared that sadism was the representative of another instinct, which was opposed to Eros. This new view, that the instincts fall into two groups, seems to explode the earlier construction of the successive stages of libidinal organization. But we do not have to break fresh ground in order to find a way out of the difficulty. The solution has been at hand for a long time and lies in the fact that what we are concerned with are scarcely ever pure instinctual impulses but mixtures in various proportions of the two groups of instincts. If this is so, there is no need to revise our view of the organizations of the libido. A sadistic cathexis of an object may also legitimately claim to be treated as a libidinal one; and an aggressive impulse against the father can just as well be subjected to repression as a tender impulse towards the mother. Nevertheless we shall bear in mind for future consideration the possibility that repression is a process which has a special relation to the genital organization of the libido and that the ego resorts to other methods of defence when it has to secure itself against the libido on other levels of organization. To continue: a case like ‘Little Hans’s’ does not enable us to come to any clear conclusion. It is true that in him an aggressive impulse was disposed of by repression, but this happened after the genital organization had been reached. We have said that as soon as the ego recognizes the danger of castration it gives the signal of anxiety and inhibits through the pleasure- unpleasure agency (in a way which we cannot as yet understand) the impending cathectic process in the id. And now the castration anxiety is directed to a different object and expressed in a distorted form, so that the patient is afraid, not of being castrated by his father, but of being bitten by a horse or devoured by a wolf. In the first place it avoids a conflict due to ambivalence (for the father was a loved object, too), and in the second place it enables the ego to cease generating anxiety. For the anxiety belonging to a phobia is conditional; it only emerges when the object of it is perceived and rightly so, since it is only then that the danger- situation is present. On the other hand one cannot get rid of a father; he can appear whenever he chooses. But if he is replaced by an animal, all one has to do is to avoid the sight of it that is, its presence in order to be free from danger and anxiety. He produced the inhibition of not leaving the house, so as not to come across any horses. The young Russian had an even easier time of it, for it was hardly a privation for him not to look at a particular picture-book any more. If his naughty sister had not kept on showing him the book with the picture of the wolf standing upright in it, he would have been able to feel safe from his fear. Inhibitions, Symptoms And Anxiety 4283 On a previous occasion I have stated that phobias have the character of a projection in that they replace an internal, instinctual danger by an external, perceptual one. The advantage of this is that the subject can protect himself against an external danger by fleeing from it and avoiding the perception of it, whereas it is useless to flee from dangers that arise from within. This statement of mine was not incorrect, but it did not go below the surface of things. For an instinctual demand is, after all, not dangerous in itself; it only becomes so inasmuch as it entails a real external danger, the danger of castration. Thus what happens in a phobia in the last resort is merely that one external danger is replaced by another. The view that in a phobia the ego is able to escape anxiety by means of avoidance or of inhibitory symptoms fits in very well with the theory that that anxiety is only an affective signal and that no alteration has taken place in the economic situation. The anxiety felt in animal phobias is, therefore, an affective reaction on the part of the ego to danger; and the danger which is being signalled in this way is the danger of castration. This anxiety differs in no respect from the realistic anxiety which the ego normally feels in situations of danger, except that its content remains unconscious and only becomes conscious in the form of a distortion. The same will prove true, I think, of the phobias of adults, although the material which their neuroses work over is much more abundant and there are some additional factors in the formation of the symptoms. The agoraphobic patient imposes a restriction on his ego so as to escape a certain instinctual danger namely, the danger of giving way to his erotic desires. For if he did so the danger of being castrated, or some similar danger, would once more be conjured up as it was in his childhood. I may cite as an instance the case of a young man who became agoraphobic because he was afraid of yielding to the solicitations of prostitutes and of contracting a syphilitic infection from them as a punishment. Inhibitions, Symptoms And Anxiety 4284 I am well aware that a number of cases exhibit a more complicated structure and that many other repressed instinctual impulses can enter into a phobia. But they are only tributary streams which have for the most part joined the main current of the neurosis at a later stage. The symptomatology of agoraphobia is complicated by the fact that the ego does not confine itself to making a renunciation. In order to rob the situation of danger it does more: it usually effects a temporal regression to infancy (in extreme cases, to a time when the subject was in his mother’s womb and protected against the dangers which threaten him in the present).

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Experimental evidence the earliest experimental evidence for the division of lexical access into two stages came from studies of the description of simple scenes (Kempen & Huijbers herbal erectile dysfunction pills uk discount generic silvitra canada, 1983) erectile dysfunction internal pump 120 mg silvitra free shipping. They analyzed the time people take before they start speaking when describing these scenes and argued that people do not start speaking until the content to erectile dysfunction herbal treatment options purchase silvitra 120 mg fast delivery be expressed has been fully identified erectile dysfunction unani medicine buy silvitra 120mg cheap. The selection of several lemmas for a multiword sentence can take place simultaneously. We cannot produce the first word of an utterance until we have accessed all the lemmas (at least for these short utterances) and at least the first phonological word-form. Further experimental evidence for two stages in lexicalization comes from Wheeldon and Monsell’s (1992) investigation of repetition priming in lexicalization. Like repetition priming in visual word recognition, this effect lasts a long time, spanning over 100 intervening naming trials. Wheeldon and Monsell showed that naming a picture is facilitated by recently having produced the name in giving a definition or reading aloud. Evidence from speeded picture naming suggests that repetition priming arises from residual activation in the connections between semantics and lemmas (Vitkovitch & Humphreys, 1991). Monsell, Matthews, and Miller (1992) looked at this effect in Welsh-English bilinguals. There was facilitation within a language, but not across (as long as the phonological forms of the words differed). Taken together the experiments show that both the meaning and phonological forms have to be activated for repetition priming in production to occur. Repetition priming occurs as a result of the strengthening of the connections between the lemmas and phonological forms. Evidence for a phase of early semantic activation in lexical selection and a later phase of phonological activation in phonological encoding comes from picture-word interference studies (Levelt et al. These experiments, discussed in more detail later in the section on the time course of lexicalization, used a picture-word interference paradigm in which participants see pictures that they have to name as quickly as possible. At about the same time they are given an auditorily presented word to which they have to make a lexical decision. Words prime semantic neighbours early on, whereas late on they prime phonological neighbours. This suggests that there is an early stage when semantic candidates are active (this is the lemma stage) and a late stage when phonological forms are active. In the most famous example of picture-word interference, the Stroop task (naming the colour in which a word is printed when the word spells out a colour name), there is striking inhibition. Usually we find interference with semantically related pairs from the same category and facilitation with phonologically related pairs. Finally, electrophysiological evidence supports the two-stage model (van Turrenout, Hagoort, & Brown, 1998). Dutch-speaking participants were shown coloured pictures and had to name with a simple noun phrase. At the same time the participants had to push buttons depending on the grammatical gender of the noun and whether or not it began with a particular sound. The electrophysiological data for the preparation of the motor movements suggested that the syntactic properties were accessed before the phonological information. Differing constraints on lexical selection and phonological encoding If lemmas and phonological forms are selected at different stages, they should be sensitive to different constraints. In particular lemma selection should be sensitive to semantic variables and the effects of context, whereas the selection of phonological forms should be sensitive to word frequency. There is a great deal of evidence that this is the case (Griffin & Bock, 1998; Harley & MacAndrew, in press; Jescheniak & Levelt, 1994). For example, Harley and MacAndrew showed that semantic word substitutions arise in lemma selection and are influenced by semantic variables such as the imageability of the words involved, whereas form-based substitutions are influenced by variables such as word length and frequency. It is an extreme form of a pause, where the word takes a noticeable time to come out (some times several weeks! You are almost certainly familiar with this phenomenon: you know what the word is, yet you are unable to get the sounds out. They appear to be universal; they have even been observed in children as young as 2 (Elbers, 1985). Partial information, such as the number of syllables, the initial letter or sound, and the stress pattern, can be retrieved. Participants also often output near phonological neighbours like “secant”, “sextet”, and “sexton”. This says that the target items are inaccessible because they are only weakly represented in the system. Burke, MacKay, Worthley, and Wade (1991) provided evidence in favour of this model from both an experimental and a diary study in a group of young and old participants. They argued that the retrieval deficit involves weak links between the semantic and phonological systems. A broadly similar approach by Harley and MacAndrew (1992) localized the deficit within a two-stage model of lexical access, between the abstract lexical units and phonological forms. They showed that the partial information provided by participants does not in time narrow or converge on the target. Brown (1991) pointed out that participants might not say out loud the interlopers in the order in which they came to mind. Furthermore, in a noisy system there is no reason why each attempt at retrieval should give the same incorrect answer. The blocking hypothesis, first mooted by Woodworth (1938), states that the target item is actively suppressed by a stronger competitor. Jones and Langford (1987) used a variant of the Brown and McNeill task known as phonological blocking to test this idea. Jones (1989) further showed that the blocker is only effective if it is presented at the time of retrieval rather than just before. However, Perfect and Hanley (1992) and Meyer and Bock (1992) discussed methodological problems with these experiments. Exactly the same results are found with these materials when the blockers are not presented, suggesting that the original results were an artefact of the materials. For example, the words “ball” and “growth” are approximately equal in their frequency of occurrence. Indeed, phonological neighbours appear to play a supporting rather than a blocking role in lexical access. They also suggest that the levels of semantic and phonological processing in lexical retrieval are distinct. The tip-of-the-tongue state is readily explained as success of the first stage of lexicalization but failure of the second. Vigliocco, Antonini, and Garrett (1997) showed that grammatical gender can be preserved in tip-of-thetongue states in Italian. That is, even though speakers cannot retrieve the phonological form of a word, they can retrieve some syntactic information about it. There is also evidence from preservation of gender in an Italian person with anomia, called Dante (Badecker, Miozzo, & Zanuttini, 1995). Dante could produce details about the grammatical gender of words that he could not produce. Information about grammatical gender is part of the lexical-semantic and syntactic information encoded by lemmas, such as knowing that a word is a noun. Hence Dante had access to the lemmas, but was then unable to access the associated phonological forms. It is important to note that for many Italian words grammatical gender is not predictable from semantics. Furthermore, Dante could retrieve the gender for both regular and exception words, which suggests that Dante could not just have used partial phonological information to predict grammatical gender. Gender can be put with other syntactic information in the lexicon, such that it is stored with words. It is possible that in an interactive activation network we would be able to retrieve the correct gender without the network being able to settle down enough to select the appropriate one of many phonological forms.